A social epistemological approach to delusions

The distinction between pathological beliefs (the delusions of patients with psychosis) and nonpathological beliefs has been debated for more than a century without resolution, and yet seems ever more important in a world in which many ‘crazy’ beliefs (conspiracy theories, political extremism) are proliferating via social media. A methodological problem that has limited progress has been the use of unrealistic comparators (mundane beliefs), which has resulted in unrealistic ideas about what makes delusions different (for example, they are said to be held with great certainty and resistant to counter-argument but the same is true of religious and political beliefs). An overlooked difference is that delusions are not shared, whereas other types of beliefs are co-produced by groups of people and then proliferated in populations. This suggests that the problem in delusions is an inability to align beliefs with those of other people. This PhD will involve the systematic comparison between delusions and religious and political beliefs with respect to the social cognitive mechanisms involved in belief alignment and also belief proliferation.